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Executive summary
• The European Union's plan for aiding recovery in member states hit by the 
coronavirus crisis has been rightly hailed as a major breakthrough for the bloc. But 
there is much less clarity on the plan's economic aims, its priorities and the content of 
the contractual arrangements it should entail between the EU and member countries. 
The plan’s main plank, the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) is widely seen as a 
short-term Keynesian stimulus. Although the EU debt is expected to be repaid through 
contributions from member states, the resulting transfers are often seen, including by 
national governments, as money from heaven. There has also been controversy over the 
conditions attached to grants and loans
• fuzziness over objectives and overloaded procedures can derail the RRF. The EU 
needs to provide clarity from the outset and put the plan on the right track. It should 
acknowledge and emphasise that the main goal of the RRF is not to contribute to 
immediate relief or a Keynesian stimulus, but to foster structural transformation, 
especially in less-advanced and harder-hit member states.
• The EU should hold back from trying to impose through overall policy conditionality 
its reform agenda on the member states. Support for digitalisation cannot be conditioned 
on pension reform. Instead, there should be a narrow-conditionality approach in which 
reforms that strongly complement intended investments should be identified and bun-
dled with that investment. A grant aimed at encouraging decarbonisation in the transport 
sector, for example, would, be made conditional on the elimination of transport fuel 
subsidies. Therefore, in national recovery and resilience plans, each bundle of invest-
ments and reforms should be focused on the limited set of policy measures that need to 
be implemented to maximise the impact of EU-financed investment.
• Meanwhile, complementarity across objectives should be addressed through a 
dialogue with each member state on the sectoral allocation of EU funding and the overall 
architecture of their recovery and resilience plans. As the provider of the funds, the EU has 
the leverage and legitimacy to be demanding in this discussion.
• The EU should emphasise where relevant the cross-border dimension of investment 
plans and should encourage member states, including financially, to cooperate on the 
design and implementation of their plans.
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Introduction
Because of its size, the way it will be financed and the fact that it involves outright cross-
country transfers, the agreement reached by European Union leaders in July 2020 on the 
European Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) was rightly hailed as a major breakthrough 
for the EU, perhaps even a ‘Hamiltonian moment’ in the process of fiscal federalisation.
But there is much less clarity on the economic aims of the RRF, its priorities and the 
content of the contractual arrangements it should entail between the EU and the member 
states. Despite the planned disbursement schedule, which would span five years, the RRF 
is widely seen as a short-term Keynesian stimulus. And despite the fact that the EU debt is 
expected to be repaid through contributions from member states, the resulting transfers 
are seen, including by national governments, as money from heaven. There has also been 
controversy over the conditions attached to grants and loans, and the resulting political 
compromise has been interpreted in various ways by the protagonists.   
Clarity is needed, therefore, first and foremost to ensure effectiveness, but also if the 
RRF is meant to provide a template for future budgetary initiatives at EU level. While its 
contours have been settled, in particular by guidance from the European Commission on the 
preparation of national plans1, much could still be done to dispel ambiguities and to define 
precisely the nature of the policy dialogue that will take place within the framework under 
construction. 
My intention here is to contribute to this clarification through (1) evaluating the 
significance of the RRF from a macroeconomic standpoint; (2) analysing its stated aims; (3) 
discussing conditionality; and (4) making proposals on tackling the crucial challenges of 
interdependence across objectives and EU countries2.
1  Macroeconomic aims 
There is by now growing agreement that the pandemic shock can be characterised as a 
combination of lockdown shock affecting simultaneously supply and demand in specific 
sectors, a resulting demand shock affecting other sectors not directly hit by the crisis, and a 
reallocation shock that will gradually trigger a transfer of resources across sectors, regions and 
possibly countries (Blanchard, 2020; Barrero and Bloom, 2020). Discussions continue on the 
significance of the demand shock or the permanent character of the reallocation shock, but 
there is broad consensus on the overall characterisation. 
The question is then: where will the EU programme help? 
Let us start from the perspective of a country that has normal access to capital markets 
and is neither on the giving nor on the receiving end of the transfers involved in the RRF 
(assume that the present value of the expected transfers from the EU budget is equal to the 
present value of expected additional contributions to the EU budget). For such a country, the 
loans component of the programme will be immaterial (because it can borrow on the market 
on exactly the same terms), and even the grants component would be of secondary impor-
tance (because they will not change the intertemporal budget constraint). Nominally, the 
country’s deficit and debt will be lower in the short run, but its off-balance sheet liabilities will 
1  See https://ec.europa.eu/info/files/guidance-member-states-recovery-and-resilience-plans_en.
2  The EU initiative, dubbed Next Generation EU, consists of a series of programmes, the most important of which 
is the Recovery and Resilience Facility. My focus here is on the €312.5 billion grant component of that facility. 
Additional grants will be provided through other programmes, especially the bridge programme ReactEU (€47.5 
billion), bringing the total to €390 billion.  
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be higher – certainly not a first-order impact. Although the Maastricht indicators for deficit 
and debt will improve, markets will certainly notice that the underlying situation remains the 
same.   
There are only two cases in which the RRF will provide a net gain. This is firstly if the EU 
agrees to finance the repayment through new own resources that genuinely broaden the 
aggregate tax base by tapping into revenue sources unavailable to national governments. 
Such resources do exist. To assume that they will be of an order of magnitude commensurate 
with the €390 billion EU debt repayment burden (plus interest) is a long shot, however3. 
The second case is an inflation tax that would be a substitute for repayment if the European 
Central Bank were to monetise the debt – again, quite a long shot4. In practice, both 
possibilities exist, but are unlikely to materialise. 
Figure 1: France, distribution over time of support measures and RRF funding, € 
billions, 2020-2025
Source: Bruegel based on the French government’s RESF report (Direction générale du Trésor, 2020). For simplicity, it is assumed that 
the Plan de relance will be disbursed over three years (2021 to 2023). Faster disbursement, as planned by the government, would only 
strengthen the argument. It is assumed that the time profile of the RRF funding will follow that indicated in Giovannini et al (2020. Perma-
nent tax cuts are excluded from the calculation.
France is a good approximation of this category of country: according to tentative ECB 
calculations (Giovannini et al, 2020), the grants it will receive, net of future repayments, 
should eventually amount to about minus 1 percent of GDP (meaning that it will be a net 
contributor)5. If cross-country spillovers are disregarded (more on this in section 4), France 
cannot expect the EU plan to make a positive medium-term contribution to its own economic 
performance, at least from a macroeconomic standpoint. It cannot expect much in the short 
term either. As apparent in Figure 1, which shows the distribution over time of the budgetary 
measures introduced in France and their partial funding by the RRF, the entirety of the 
short-term pandemic package and the bulk of the overall budgetary support will be financed 
by the national budget. The EU will finance only one-fourth of the total budgetary support 
(excluding permanent tax cuts) engineered in response to the shock.
3  See for details my recent report with Clemens Fuest to the informal Ecofin of September 2020 (Fuest and Pisani-
Ferry, 2020). A new EU own resource will broaden the aggregate tax base if the source it taps into cannot be 
taxed individually by member states, either because it has a genuinely pan-European character or because tax 
competition prevents tax initiatives by individual countries. 
4  A mere decision by the ECB to roll over its debt portfolio would not materially soften the government budget 
constraint. See Blanchard and Pisani-Ferry (2020). 
5  This calculation assumes that repayments will be based on each country’s share of the EU’s Gross National 
Income. Net transfers may eventually differ if new meaningful new own resources are created. The ECB 
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However the same reasoning does not apply to the countries that are major beneficiaries 
of the RRF. Gross transfers are expected to reach 16 percent of GNI for Bulgaria, 13.5 percent 
for Greece, 8 percent for Poland and Portugal, and 5 percent for Italy (Darvas, 2020). For many 
countries in southern and central-eastern Europe, transfers net of expected repayments should 
exceed by far the aid worth 2.6 percent of recipient’s GDP that the United States granted to 
Europe under the Marshall Plan (Steil, 2019). In addition, these countries will benefit from 
being able to borrow on more favourable terms through the loan component of the RRF and 
other liquidity lines, because the EU will pass on to them the very favourable conditions it is 
expected to benefit from when tapping the bond market6. 
It is through the combination of this structural transfer and this provision of liquidity on 
favourable terms that the RRF is expected to support a subset of EU countries in a significant 
way. Such amounts represent a major relief. If invested shrewdly, they could change the 
recipient countries’ economic fates. They would also improve the overall outlook for the EU, 
indirectly benefitting countries that are net payers into the scheme. 
The upshot is that a clear division of tasks is at work in the EU. States have shouldered 
most of the immediate response to the lockdown shock, with the help of the ECB’s Pandemic 
Emergency Purchase Programme and, to some extent, of the EU’s SURE facility7. They also 
remain in charge of coping with the ensuing demand shock, as the EU has not provided and 
will not provide meaningful Keynesian stimulus. But the RRF will contribute significantly 
to the response to the reallocation shock by supporting medium-term oriented measures 
in less-advanced and hard-hit countries. In these countries, it could be a major help in 
fostering economic transformation, addressing structural deficiencies, improving economic 
performance and preventing further divergence from the EU core8. For this to happen, the 
RRF must be designed appropriately.  
2  Recovery and resilience: a multi-purpose 
plan
The mechanics of grant allocation under the RRF are by now clear. Amounts available to 
member states are (and, for the still-unallocated part, will be) determined on the basis of 
numerical criteria. Access will be conditional on approval of plans submitted by the member 
states, which should be consistent with general objectives set out by the EU. Implementation 
will be monitored by the EU and disbursements will be conditional on fulfilment of agreed 
milestones and targets.   
As defined by the EU, the RRF pursues several objectives simultaneously. The European 
Council conclusions of July 2020 spelled out the goal to “set the Union firmly on the path 
to a sustainable and resilient recovery, creating jobs and repairing the immediate damage 
caused by the COVID-19 pandemic whilst supporting the Union’s green and digital priorities” 
(European Council, 2020a, paragraph A2). They also indicated that for assessing the RRF, 
plans put forward by member states should demonstrate “consistency with the country-specific 
recommendations … [while] strengthening the growth potential, job creation and economic 
and social resilience of the Member State shall need the highest score”. Finally, it was added 
6  Darvas (2020) puts the corresponding net present value benefit at 1.3 percent of GNI for Italy. 
7  Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency; see https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/
economic-and-fiscal-policy-coordination/financial-assistance-eu/funding-mechanisms-and-facilities/sure_en.
8  From a political economy standpoint, the EU initiative may also serve as a coordination device and avoid that 
some member states free-ride on their neighbours’ fiscal action. In a low interest rates environment where 
multipliers are high, such coordination could yield non-insignificant benefits. 
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that “effective contribution to the green and digital transition shall also be a prerequisite 
for a positive assessment”. This is a long list in which priorities are not clearly defined. A 
previous Commission proposal (European Commission, 2020a) and further Commission 
documents (the Annual Sustainable Growth Strategy 2021 (European Commission, 2020b) 
and the guidance to member states for the preparation of recovery and resilience plans 
(European Commission, 2020c)) list more or less the same objectives, although with variable 
categorisation and emphasis.
The 17 September guidance for the preparations of national recovery and resilience plans 
(European Commission, 2020c) lists four general objectives:
• Promoting the Union’s economic, social and territorial cohesion; 
• Strengthening economic and social resilience; 
• Mitigating the social and economic impact of the crisis; 
• Supporting the green and digital transitions.
In more concrete terms, the guidance document indicates that member states should 
present plans consisting of a series of “coherent components” composed of reforms and 
investments. Each bundle of investment and reform will be assessed separately against three 
main criteria: 
• Whether it tackles the country’s priority challenges as outlined in the EU’s country-
specific recommendations; 
• Whether it is conducive to the digital and green transitions; 
• Whether it contribute effectively to the RRF’s overall goals9.
The national plans should also meet the requirement that a minimum of 37 percent of 
expenditure is related to climate and 20 percent to the digital transition.  
By adopting this scheme, the EU has aimed to find a compromise between conflicting 
aims, both vertically and horizontally. Vertically, it intends to leave the initiative to the 
member states, while ensuring that money is spent in accordance with what is regarded as 
priority challenges. Horizontally, it intends to make progress towards overall objectives such 
as the green transition and digitalisation, while addressing country-specific challenges of high 
unemployment and dismal growth. It has also tried to balance the conflicting objectives of 
structural transformation and disbursement speed.  
These are commendable goals. The question, however, is if the procedures in place give a 
good chance of reaching them. Clearly, the risk is that the whole process becomes a box-
ticking exercise. Having negotiated the total amount of support they are entitled to receive, 
countries may well regard the EU template as a pointless bureaucratic hassle deprived of 
substantive content, and either paint their projects with the required colours, or pick and 
choose those of their existing programmes that have the best chance of meeting the EU 
criteria. By the same token, trade-offs between objectives may be overlooked and the pan-
European dimension may end up being ignored.  
9  Box on “overarching principles underpinning a component” in Section 1 of Part 2 (European Commission, 2020c).
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3  Addressing the controversy over 
conditionality
In large part because of the legacy of the Troika programmes implemented in 2010-2012 in 
the context of the euro crisis, conditionality has been a contentious issue in discussions on 
the design of the RRF. The established EU philosophy, as enshrined in the European Stability 
Mechanism treaty, was that “strict conditionality” goes hand in hand with financial assistance. 
But potential beneficiaries such as Italy have argued vocally that the pandemic crisis has had 
an exogenous character and that solidarity cannot be conditioned on structural reforms. 
In the end, the political compromise has left the initiative to member states but to spell out 
criteria for the assessment of their plans. 
It should be clear that conditionality is indispensable. Whereas immediate relief 
provided to hard-hit member states on solidarity grounds or temporary transfers aiming 
at pure macroeconomic stabilisation should not be subject to the fulfilment of economic 
policy conditions, new structural transfers worth several percentage points of GDP that aim 
at improving economic performance, strengthening resilience or fostering the transition 
towards a digitalised, greener economy cannot be handed out unconditionally. This would be 
a recipe for political capture – if not, as argued by Wolff (2020), outright corruption. 
The question therefore is not the principle of conditionality but its purpose and design. 
This is the challenge the European institutions have tried to tackle, and this is still the 
challenge the EU faces. 
Conceptually, there are two types of solution to the problem. The first is to devise a 
broad set of policy actions that are deemed critical with respect to priority objectives, and to 
condition the financing of the whole programme on these actions. This top-down approach is 
the philosophy underlying International Monetary Fund conditional lending: the granting of 
assistance is conditional on an overall programme and actual disbursements are conditional 
on the fulfilment of pre-agreed milestones. The same approach can easily be applied to 
medium term-oriented programmes aiming at lifting potential output, alleviating structural 
unemployment, reducing inequality or fostering decarbonisation. 
The difficulty with this approach – quite apart from the question of its political 
acceptability – is the selection of the priority actions. As emphasised by Hausmann et al 
(2005), priorities should not be chosen from a laundry list of desirable reforms, but by 
prioritising policy initiatives that help to allocate scarce political capital to the lifting of the 
most binding constraints on economic activity (or any other objective, be it social justice or a 
low environment footprint)10. 
According to this approach – let us call it broad conditionality – reforms should therefore 
not be looked at one by one, but rather as a system, and the choice of a reform strategy 
should be dictated by the ranking of the marginal efficiency of individual measures (and the 
complementarity between them). An effective recovery programme should therefore make 
overall financial support conditional on a critical set of priority reforms. 
The second, more bottom-up solution is to start instead from the specific aims of sectoral 
grants – be they for innovation, employment, education, digitalisation or the greening of the 
economy – and to determine for each what immediately adjacent conditions are required to 
improve the effectiveness of the money spent. With this approach, the question is not what 
the most binding constraint on the aggregate outcome is, but what reforms that strongly 
complement the intended investment and should therefore be bundled with it. A grant aimed 
at encouraging decarbonisation in a certain sector, say transport, would, for example, be 
made conditional on the elimination of transport fuel subsidies. Similarly, a grant targeting 
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digitalisation would be conditional on the introduction of coding courses in high school 
programmes. Let us call this approach narrow conditionality11. 
This type of conditionality does not start from a superior knowledge of what is good for 
a given country, but from the conditions that must be met so that money spent with certain 
goals actually achieves these goals. In this case, the legitimacy of setting conditions is simply 
that grants are means to aim for certain goals, and that the grant-giver has a responsibility for 
ensuring that these goals have a good chance of achievement.   
The EU has apparently chosen to blend these two solutions. The bundling of EU-financed 
investments and flanking reforms goes in the direction of narrow conditionality, while the 
reference to the often very macro country-specific recommendations and the requirement 
that each of the components be assessed against the whole list of EU objectives suggests that 
a much broader approach will prevail. 
There is nothing wrong in trying to combine the two approaches, but this should be done 
on the basis of an unambiguous definition of where each of them applies. By not choosing 
between them, the EU is running the risk of relying on an ill-defined method that will 
complicate serious discussion on national reform plans and increase the risk of content-free 
box-ticking.
Moreover, the EU should not avoid hard choices. At this stage, because broad 
conditionality is a political non-starter, and because aggregate monetary entitlements have 
been defined already, the EU would be well-advised to embrace narrow conditionality 
explicitly. This would imply inviting member states to structure the components of their 
recovery and resilience plans around key investments and a parsimonious selection of 
complementary reforms. Policy dialogue between the EU and the member state would then 
focus on the composition of these components, that is, on the matching of reforms and 
investments. 
As developed in the next section, such an approach should still leave room for dialogue 
between the EU and the member states on the overall architecture of the national recovery 
and resilience programme. But it would avoid overarching controversies over the conditions 
attached to financial support. To be clear, it would leave no room for making support for 
digitalisation conditional on a reform of the pension system.
4  Interdependence across objectives and 
member states
The downside of narrow conditionality is, however, that it risks leaving aside two issues. First, 
it could fail to address interdependence across objectives. It would not take cross derivatives 
into account and could therefore result in a suboptimal allocation of means. Concretely, 
investment and reform in a certain field, say product-market competition, may have 
significant effects on labour markets that will not be accounted for in an excessively granular 
approach that focuses on specific objectives and flanking conditions12. This could result in 
significant shortcomings and a less effective programme.
Second, narrow conditionality would equally miss interdependence across countries. It 
is well known that the existence of cross-country spillovers results in the suboptimality of 
11 The United States has a certain tradition in this respect that goes back at least to the New Deal: the federal 
government manages an array of categorical grants with the aim of encouraging state and local governments to 
move into new policy areas and expand efforts identified as national priorities (Congressional Research Service, 
2019).
12 The example is borrowed from Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003). 
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a country-by-country approach to policy reform. Such spillovers may not be significant for 
standard growth-enhancing reforms (Tabellini and Wyplosz, 2006), but they are much more 
important for the digital and green agendas. In both cases, research, standardisation and 
network externalities make the results of initiatives in one country dependent on initiatives in 
the EU as a whole. 
Hence, whereas the neglect of cross-country spillovers can be regarded as a second-
order issue for, say, labour-market reforms, this does not apply to significant part of the 
recovery and resilience agenda. Moreover, although the Commission’s initial proposals 
included a strong European public goods aspect, the political economy of the negotiation 
led unfortunately to their almost complete neglect in the final agreement reached by the 
European Council in July 2020 (European Council, 2020a). By itself, narrow conditionality is 
unlikely to bring them back to the fore. 
These are significant problems. Interdependence across objectives is a major issue for 
the RRF, because its various aims are not necessarily coherent. To take the most obvious 
example, the greening of the economy and the enhancement of growth potential will be hard 
to reconcile, at least in the medium term. Because it implies an accelerated discarding of 
significant parts of the existing capital stock (and even more so if the transition is intended 
to be fast), greening can in fact be regarded as a negative supply shock that will adversely 
affect potential output in the short run. The same applies to a great extent to some aspects 
of the resilience requirement, which may lead to trade-off efficiency for security of supplies, 
even if this lowers potential output. The design of an appropriate plan therefore requires that 
strategic complementarities and strategic substitutabilities between objectives are both taken 
into account.
Cross-country spillovers are also a major concern. Beyond the green and digital agendas, 
they can also be found wherever the single market is involved. For example strategic 
autonomy, which was recently promoted as a key objective of the EU, must be regarded 
as a property of the EU system as a whole, rather than of its national components taken 
in isolation13. Achieving such autonomy – for whatever it means concretely – will require 
coordination between member states.    
These challenges can be addressed, however, because the EU retains strong leverage: 
it is ultimately the provider of funding and therefore must have a say in the allocation of 
money between, say, infrastructure investment, incentives for R&D and vocational training. 
In this capacity, it has undisputable legitimacy for discussing with each member state what 
components its recovery and resilience plan should include and how much funding will 
be allocated to each of them. In other words, it is hard to deny the EU a strong voice in the 
determination of the overall architecture of recovery and resilience plans, and the relative 
funding of the associated investment packages. 
Instead of drawing up a long list of desirable reforms for every EU country, the EU should 
therefore prepare for a two-level dialogue with each: first on the major priorities of their 
recovery and resilience plans and the corresponding allocation of funds, and second on 
the reforms to be included in each component. The Commission should, for example, first 
take a view on whether broadband access, business innovation or skills should be part of 
the recovery and resilience plan of a recipient country, and in a second stage, discuss with 
the national government which reforms of telecom regulation, incentives for private R&D or 
vocational training are required to maximise the impact of the EU grant. 
Cross-country coordination issues could similarly be addressed within the framework 
of the discussion on the recovery and resilience plans. The very fact that there are minimal 
requirements for the proportion of funding to be allocated to the digital agenda and the 
green agenda already goes in this direction. The Commission should go one step further 
by assessing the coherence of national plans in fields that correspond to EU priorities and 
incentivising member states to engage in cross-border projects. To this end, it could make use 
13  See the European Council Conclusions of 2 October 2020 (European Council, 2020b).
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of EU budget funds to top up support given within the framework of the RRF to projects that 
have an explicit cross-border dimension. For example, the EU should encourage governments 
that have indicated an intention to foster the development of hydrogen to devise coordinated 
strategies, and should provide extra support to member states that engage in joint projects.    
Both the cross-sectoral and cross-country aspects should be emphasised by the 
Commission in the discussion about recovery and resilience plans. These are not domains 
where the Commission should be afraid of issuing directions. In particular, the Commission 
has a legitimate role in taking care of the cross-border spillovers that member states naturally 
fail to consider.
5  Conclusions
Ensuring the success of the RRF is a high-stakes challenge for the EU. Success is by no means 
guaranteed and the cost of failure would be very high. If the plan succeeds, it will surely pave 
the way to further initiatives, and perhaps ultimately to a fiscal union alongside the monetary 
union established two decades ago. But if the RRF fails to deliver on stated goals, if political 
interests prevail over economic necessity, if the money is wasted, the very legitimacy of EU 
initiatives will be affected and, for sure, federal aspirations will be dashed for a generation.
Fuzziness over objectives and overloaded procedures can derail the process. But the EU 
still has time and the means to put things straight. It should: 
• Acknowledge and emphasise that the main goal of the RRF is not to contribute to imme-
diate relief or a Keynesian stimulus, but to foster structural transformation, especially in 
less-advanced and hard-hit member states; 
• Abstain from trying to impose through overall policy conditionality its reform agenda on 
the member states; 
• Endorse a narrow-conditionality approach to the design of national recovery and resil-
ience plans and focus for each bundle of investments and reforms on the limited set of 
policy measures that need to be implemented to maximise the impact of EU-financed 
investments; 
• Address complementarity across objectives through a dialogue with each member state 
on the sectoral allocation of EU funding and the overall architecture of their recovery and 
resilience plans; 
• Emphasise when relevant the cross-border dimension of investment plans and encourage 
member states, including through financial incentives, to cooperate on the design and the 
implementation of their plans
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